Constitutional Judicial Activism in North Macedonia

Abstract

The sui generis character of constitutional adjudication in the Republic of North Macedonia derives from the fact that, in Europe, there appears to be no other Constitutional Court whose jurisdiction, organisation, procedures and functioning are regulated exclusively by the Constitution and in its own internal act, without the support of a separate statutory framework. This constitutional peculiarity creates scope for two distinct approaches. The first would be for the Court to adhere to a formalistic interpretation and preserve the existing status quo. Such an approach would undoubtedly provide a comfortable and convenient position for both the Court and other state institutions, including the Assembly, the Government and other public authorities. However, it would contribute little, if anything, to the advancement of the rule of law. The second approach would require the Court to move beyond formalism and demonstrate judicial activism. Such an approach inevitably gives rise to tensions, and at times conflicts, with other state authorities, as well as to pressures and influences of varying nature and intensity, predominantly of a political character. Nevertheless, this approach plays a significantly role in shaping constitutional, legal and political culture and constitutes a substantial contribution to the development of a democratic state founded on the rule of law. This paper examines the concrete consequences arising from the adoption of either of these two approaches.