

A NEW APPROACH TO NATIONAL AND INTERNATIONAL CRISIS MANAGEMENT IN THE HUNGARIAN LEGAL REGULATION

Abstract

National and international crisis influence one's sense of security. Therefore, the adequate management of different types of crisis is essential. For choosing the correct methodology, an analysis of the own capabilities (force, power, national interest) is inevitable. The so-called „DIADAL (or DDADAC - Diagnosis, Direction, Alternatives, Decision, Application, Closing)”-methodology offers a possible solution for the general reader. Successful management of a crisis which, as we know from ample experience, is an often complex and time consuming process for those military, law enforcement and national organisations responsible for its management. The chances of success can be increased if the participants are aware of those multiple processes and concepts which influence the outcome of any given crisis. The aim of my paper was to focus attention to a crisis management approach which is suitable for any type of crisis.

Keywords: *challenge, risk, threat, crisis, crisis management*

1. Introduction

*„...I do not take communion with the frivolous hope
that some coincidence will save us...”
(Carl von Clausewitz)²*

For the individual, lesser or greater human communities and social organizations – due to their direct or indirect involvement and effects – researching crises, understanding the results and organizing our experience is vital. Efforts made to evade hazards threatening the human safety have long past in history. Every crisis phenomenon, which affects

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² G. Perjés, *Clausewitz*, 45.

a community on any level of organization, foreshadows the possibility of damaging the consensual norms formed in it. This could harm the values and/or interest of the given community based on consensus, which also endangers the generally defined sense of security.

The disintegration of the military-power based bipolar world caused significant changes. These include the surfacing of conflicts suppressed – namely repressed by military force – during the years of the brittle Cold War. The menacing peril of a nuclear war had disappeared but the world has not become safer nor integrated. Ideological, religious, ethnic, national, and regional disputes had arose mainly caused by the lack of stability. The newly occurred crises endangered many regions' safety and inclined international organizations to prevent conflicts, handle emerging sources of stress and crises, recover and keep peace.

Actions related to crisis management – due to the characteristics and complexity of conflicts – sought to explore and terminate the causes, sources and to restore the complete state of peace / peace condition. In the changed environment of security policy – along with the geopolitical and geostrategic challenges – occurring recent crises aimed the surface which were fulminant and had prolonged lifespan. Therefore the methods of prevention and crisis management had to be significantly changed to preserve effectiveness. To be able to manage the crises concerning the military dimension of security new methods had to evolved, not just on federal but national level. Besides the former unequivocal military threat countries must prepare themselves to construe assignments deriving from the problem of migration, drugs, national, religious, ethnic affiliation, terrorists, information technology, finance, homeland security and to draw action and implementation plans. The Revolution of Military Affairs, (RMA)³, the effort to achieve information superiority, the theory of 'war without death', the asymmetric warfare demanded new types of armed forces to precisely plan, construe and execute tasks.

³ The main stations – by experts – of revolution taking place in military:

The cooperation of German branches during the II. WW and in the time of the polish and west-european campaign;

The activity of RAF during the Battle of Britain;

The activity of German submarines;

The appearance and use of American nuclear weapons;

The mass use of reconnaissance, electronic war-technical tools in the Gulf War,

H-Holman, BARTLETT, T. PAUL-SOMES, *Einsatzplanung militärische Revolutionen und die Tyranne der Technologie*, 1

2. Security Challenges, risks and threats until 2030

2.1. Theoretical basics

The chapter is based on the 2010's analyses the likely occurring security and national security risks and threats until 2030, furthermore formulates proposals on solving these problems. I analyze the conditions influencing the security and national security of our country in a particular subchapter.

The security challenges, risks and threats „are situations and conditions that carry danger and threat within them which usually have negative effects on a given country's overall security, or its components and weaken the inner and outer stability”.⁴ The general definition of risk: An action resulting in the possibility of danger, loss.”⁵ Security risk – due to the general definition – can be interpreted in respect of the security dimensions. Threat is the concrete, will of action displaying form of danger, which purpose is to influence the target country's behaviour in order to endorse own interests. We can mainly speak of threat if there is a possibility of extorting or solving forcibly the conflicts of interests. When judging the military threat we have to take into consideration the being of will of state and politics and have to evaluate their military relations. So we have to make intent and military capability analyses of our environment, reviewing those possible hazards that could affect our country.

The challenges: The complex of situations and conditions on the lowest manifestation level of possible hazards - whose resultants in general adversely influence the internal and external stability and can affect the authoritral relations of a given region – which influence the components of the generally interpreted security.

The risks: The complex of situations and conditions on that manifestation level of possible hazards which influence the components of the generally interpreted security and that could violate national interests, thereby losses occur.

The threats: The complex of situations and conditions on the highest manifestation level of possible hazards which influence the components of the generally interpreted security and that could violate national interests, and might indirectly influence the preservation of national values. The methods and instruments of representation of interest

⁴ *Hadtudományi Lexikon*, (Ed. J. Szabó), Magyar Hadtudományi Társaság, Budapest 1992., 42, Comp., T. Kőszegvári, *A közép-európai térség és Magyarország biztonságát fenyegető veszélyek az 1990-es években, Országos Kiemelt Társadalomtudományi Kutatások*, Budapest, 1993-1996., 14.

⁵ J. Matus, „Válságkezelés és konfliktusok megelőzése“, *Új Honvédségi Szemle* 10/1995, 47.

prefer enforcement or the possibility of forcible solutions.⁶As it marks out of the definitions I regard the challenges, risks and threats as the manifestation of possible hazards, which usually adversely influence the internal and external stability and can affect the authoritl relations of a given region. These definitions built on each other hypothesize increasing stress level in order. Following their nature these can only be interpreted as a dynamic process. Therefore, the theoretical interpretation of the definitions is important, but in practice they are often appear overlapped, merged with each other, and may vary depending on the external environmental characteristics (such as political and economic conditions). Evaluation and analysis can only be performed retrospectively and often only after the development of an additional stabilization force field. On the level of risks and challenges mainly concerns the environmental and industrial elements which is connected to the military element's military-technological dimension.



Source: I. Resperger: *The changed tasks of armed forces in managing of military crises*, 152.

1st illustration

⁶ I. Resperger, *The changed tasks of armed forces in managing of military crises*, PhD dissertation, Budapest 2002., 45.


Theoretical principals related to conflict, conflict-prevention, crisis and crisis management.

I approach the concepts, definitions on the subject through interstate-relations. Literature in most cases basically discerns 4 conditions⁷: peace condition, crisis condition, armed conflict and after-crisis-management peace condition (peace-2). Peace condition's characteristic is that the relations between states and/or the groups of countries based on mutual trust and compliance with taking into consideration of common interests and fair values. The characteristic of crisis conditions is that the good relations due to some kind of dispute or conflict of interests/values deteriorates, stress arise between the actors who try to shape the situation by some means. We speak of military endangerment if the efforts (political, diplomatic, industrial and other) proved to be ineffective and the relation between parties continues to deteriorate, which manifest in pressure, force demonstration, provocations, concentration of troops and border violations of military nature. The feature of after-conflict peace condition is that the actions related to conflict management reach their main goal – the recreation of peace – but to keep up and to reinforce the consolidated crisis management measures usually actions are put in place which prevent possible further confrontations. These actions are aimed to reduce the stress level but optionally the longer-than-needed use delays the emerge of peace condition.

Based on the presumption of Michael S. Lund mainly the diplomatic, political and international organizations and the military force actions given a conflict's stages could be diagrammatically represented. The first I analyze, in relation with the illustration, is the category of essential (vital) values and interests.

⁷ G. Szternák, *A válságok kialakulása és kezelésük lehetséges módja*, Jegyzet, Budapest 1994., 26., Comp., Other experts use also: „Peace 1”; Crisis; (activities below the threshold of war), War, „Peace-2” definitions, because the „Béke-2” marks a different status then the „Peace 1” in the beginning. M. S. Lund, *Preventing Violent Conflicts*, Strategy for Preventive Diplomacy, United States Institute of Peace Press, Washington D. C. 1996, 39-43. Differentiates: peace, solid peace, crisis, armed conflict, war periods.

Intensity and stages of crisis



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Source: M. S. Lund, *Preventing Violent Conflicts*, 39.; D.H. JENTZ, „Führungssystem im Wandel“, Österreichische Militärische Zeitschrift 2/1995, 127. Source: I. Resperger, *The changed tasks of armed forces in managing of military crises*, 151.

Ed., István Resperger

2nd illustration

2.1.1. The essential (vital) values and interests

National interest is a term defining a nation's goods, benefits and needs. It is an essential conditionality regarding the nation's survival, consolidation and development. It is the decisive factor in the existence of state sovereignty. National interest related to the defense of state can be outlined in the context of hazards and risks threatening the state with armed violence. Some American researchers⁸ differentiate the general term (interest) by the potential risks. Thus we can distinguish: the vital interest, the particular interest, the major interest and the interest's categories.

Vital Interest (crucial national interest): The complexity of crucial, survival ensuring social needs -related to the nations persistency and consolidation - which has considerable importance in national existence.

⁸ W. O. Studenmaier, „Hádzászati koncepciók“, In, J. Kovács, *Állami szuverenitás, nemzeti érdek, hádzászat*, 36-50.

Therefore, its enforcing and safeguarding from national side could be associated with radical risk-taking and the maximal, dedicated concentration of national resources what optionally manifest as undertaking total armed confrontation.

Particular interest (basic national interest): A complexity of vital social needs - determining the national existence – what, to enforce and safeguard, the state undertake great risk but its level is below of the nationhood.

Major interest (important national interest): A complexity of social needs what, to enforce and safeguard, the state endeavors without undertaking greater risks (e.g. temporary disposal of the country's air space or territory to foreign armed forces for trespassing).

Interest (simple national interest): A complexity of social needs which tends to raise the national welfare. The accent is on its enforcing, the safeguarding is usually preventive and indirect without the application of armed forces (e.g. material, technical, financial, training and assistance).

The value: The Concise Hungarian Dictionary says: "the attribute of something what reflects importance to society and to the individual". Experts usually classify here a country's culture, language, or cultural and artistic heritage, which is linked to the population. Values rather than interests are more persistent in a given social environment due to that the interests are articulated along the values as a result of the inner changes of society. Values basically redefined only as a result of inner or outer whole-society-affecting drastical changes.

2.1.2. The debate, The hazard

The security challenges, risks and threats „are situations and conditions that carry danger and threat within them which usually have negative effects on a given country's overall security, or its components and weaken the inner and outer stability.”⁹ Debate: relation, situation when the parties conflict their interests (e.g. negotiation). The condition of closure is to have the parties make a compromise in a way to appropriately represent their own interest.¹⁰ By danger to society we generally mean the potential possibility of an occurring phenomena that could negatively affect a security dimension. A circumstance related to security that bears the possibility of whole society affecting negative impacts.¹¹ General definition of risk: „*Risk associated with an action, the possibility of loss*”.

⁹ J. Szabó, 42., Comp., T. Köszegvári, *A közép-európai térség és Magyarország biztonságát fenyegető veszélyek az 1990-es években*, Országos Kiemelésű Társadalomtudományi Kutatások, Budapest 1993-1996, 14.

¹⁰ J. Matus, 47.


¹¹ *Magyar Értelmező Kéziszótár*, 745.

2.1.3. The Force and Power

Force and power are one of the instruments of armed fight. „War is the use of strength against the other's will”¹² (Morgenthau). The connection between force and power derives from the fact that every political action directly or indirectly is actually the act of using power, which form and density depends on the goal desired, and the implementer's determination. The grades of enforcing force and power are as follows: demonstration, threatening, enforcing, punishing, exerting pressure, use of military force.¹³

Users of diplomatic and material force

Source: *Global Trends 2030: Alternative Worlds* a publication of the National Intelligence Council, 17.



3rd illustration

¹² P. Deák, „A biztonságot fenyegető kihívások, konfliktusok, válságok, háborúk”, *Védelmi Tanulmányok* 3/1997, 4.

¹³ *Ibid.*

3. Characteristics of crises

3.1. Initial period

Some kind of dispute could surface between parties over a shorter or longer latency which is usually based on some kind of interest or conflict of interests. This period is highly uncertain. The need of information becomes the most important between directly and indirectly involved parties. The following main questions could be conceived¹⁴: who are the possible actors, what basic interest they have, what could spring the crisis? Answering questions, drawing conclusions by analyzing intelligence and further information gathering could help the operation of parties. Obviously the opposing sides' risk taking willingness – how far they willing to go in the „grab it, leave it¹⁵” game – in enforcing their interests is an important question: will they use armed force or back off due to sanctions.

Eventually the first „initial” period is about information gathering, analyzing, processing and planning of further actions.¹⁶ At the end of the first phase after carefully analyzing the gathered information, the conclusions various strategies could be set out for taking several political, diplomatic, economic, maybe military actions. The prerequisite of right decisions is the gathering, processing, forwarding of the information needed. After preliminary processing an accordingly put together „body” or team mediates the summarized assessment to the decision maker. The „body” helps the processing, filtering of information, compiles the possible action plans for the decision maker, draws recommendations and counsels. It should be noted, that the „body” makes declaration in consequence of its existing knowledge. If there is not enough information or it's quality is low the objectivity of decision-making could become damaged. In an ideal system the decision maker has to be placed as close as possible to the crises to be able to make the right decisions.

In the process the first main phase is the planning, which requires appropriate prevision, awareness and analytical skills. During the *making* the frame of responsibilities and the connection between the decision-making and decision-executing groups. The governmental structure has to be reorganized in the *reduction* phase if needed, because crises could not always be solved with measures effective in peace status. It is practical to inform the people with the essential information of the situation.

¹⁴ J. Matus, 50

¹⁵ H. Kissinger, *Diplomácia*, Bp.1997., 116.

¹⁶ T. Kőszegvári, „Biztonság és információ (hír)szerzés”, *Hadtudomány* 3/1993, 15-18; H. J. Jentzsch, *Führungssysteme im Wandel von Sicherheitspolitik und Strategie*, 127-132; P. Nagy, „Nemzetbiztonság az információs korszakban”, *Külpolitika* Summer/1998, 64-96.

For the method of *prevention megelőzés* forevision is a must to be able to recognize the crisis by its initial characteristics in this way to prepare for the probable stress and to be able to plan the response. The effectiveness of *response* is highly dependent on the estimate of situation, the resistance to the initial instability exciting effects and the dynamism of the system which can react, with optimal effectiveness, to challenges appropriately and timely. The existence and realization of these factors guarantee the operation of the appropriate action plans. In the *solution* phase the adequate informing of general public is still important, which could shape the public moral in each phase of crisis. In analyzing crises the major objective is to type it as sophisticated as possible. The seminar of Marshall Center has differentiated emergencies of „*security nature*” and „*non security nature*”.¹⁷ Security natured are terrorism, taking hostages, armed conflict, war; non security natured are catastrophes (storms, floods, earthquakes) or the collision of the monetary system. Security emergency directly threatens the existence of a country's or region's population. In the other type emergency acts indirectly. Different types of crisis require different types of coordination procedures from the crisis-management organizations. A given crisis-management organization has to comprehend the given management levels in crisis managing operations to be able to take further actions. This is essential because an organization with given managing functions is allowed to implement response on its own and higher level of management is needed for its operations which gives an overall picture of the whole crisis management procedure. Usually the „non-security natured” emergencies can be treated by previously made and approved action plans, so the organizations directly involved are able to overallly implement the management functions (e.g. planning, organizing, coordinating, monitoring). „Security Natured” emergencies usually acquire higher level approval for the already existing or newly worked out action plans and after that the implementation can take place. Depending on the type of crisis the measurements and political goals could be planned and dependent on the situation (non planned). In both cases during the implementation and enforcement we can generate stress increasing reactions which could negatively affect the procedure of conflict management.¹⁸

3.2. The development phase of crisis

After the dangers and possibilities are clearly drawn and the incentives, sanctions were not satisfactory in restoring the pre-conflict state the crisis process steps into the development phase. Due to the sustained stress further instruments and methods are taking place. In

¹⁷ W. Heinkel, „A válságtípusok”, *A George C. Marshall Központ kiadványa*, Budapest 1999., I-3.

¹⁸ Comp., S.M. Mortensen, „Crisis and Disaster”, *Atlantic Press* 1/1997, 42.

this period uncertainty and oversensitivity arise and the need of military and political actions might surface. "Security dilemma" – that is each party takes the other's as „offensive" and all own actions as „defensive" – increases the uncertainty. This is amplified by the fact that the originator's activity is always more prominent. Usually the originator – to enforce their interests – pressurizes in some way while the other – to enforce their own interests – reacts. In this phase politics – as primal „pully gear" – decides that how the given state connects its own "gear" (economical, humanitarian, monetary, diplomatic, military) with others'. In choosing the right military actions the „Huntington paradox" will always prevail: *„The soldiers feel responsible for security and to keep them in the right track in their advisory and executing role the implementation of the so called „civil-control might always cause stress."*¹⁹

Time factor (war on time) was an essential characteristic of the Yugoslavian war too. „Aggressors" tried to make rapid successes, while the „endurers" tried to inspire the international organizations to intervene as soon as possible. The lack of time usually described as "decision density", because the lack of information, or the opposite, abundance of information could cause stress to the decision makers. Besides time timing can be a crucial factor of conflict management, because the so called conflict-curve can be easily analyzed afterwards. It is simple to define the optimal time and spot for interventions retroactively but the timeliness and forevision requires immediate actions to prevent escalation. That is the inter-process interventions in given time and space have high risks, the exact assessment of their efficiency is only possible after the end of crisis. The power and influence of the parties taking side during the conflict has their biggest role in the development phase. During this phase the parties using their power and influence constantly.²⁰

As I mentioned before, the parties acts on each other mutually, so a certain level of resistance is generated against pressure which could deepen the conflict. A solid, real threat assumes the being of actual and needed potentials to come with it. Of these, threat's most recognizable components are as follows: economical, technological, military dimensions; size of population as a static element. So threat comes with the recognition of aggressor, marking the enemy which leads to the development of the Image of Enemy.²¹ Daniel Frei was looking for the image of self, the sensed image, and image of enemy while he was researching the US-Soviet relationship from 1980-84. The image of enemy and other country's sensed image affect the relationships. To harmonize these images diplomatic empathy

¹⁹ S. P. Huntington, *A katona és az állam*, 76.

²⁰ M. Weber, *Gazdaság és társadalom*, Közgazdasági Kiadó, Budapest 1970., 15-48.

²¹ P. Deák, 2.

is required from both sides, which is facilitated by mutual trust and open ambience. Their being provides the possibility to clarify interests, mutual persuasion and to make prospective compromises. In many cases the conflict ends, but the interest-collision remains.

3. 3. The culmination of crisis

The culmination of crisis is when the tension level reaches the critical level and so that the processes densify. All this happen in a different dimension on the level of armed fight (war). Of course not all conflict lead to armed clash.²² During the cold war the crisis phases were comprehended stepwise and progressively. This was called the theory of „*stepwise extension of war crisis*”.²³

Reaching the culmination of crisis means the undertaking of open confrontation, which results in limited diplomatic possibilities. The failure in using incentives and sanctions causes the activation of military potentials. This process come into being in a dynamic reaction (series of responses) between patries. which is in proportion with the range of threat. The chance of military confrontation stresses the question of justice.²⁴

3. 4. End phase

The final phase is where efforts are made to come to agreement, to make peace. It is important, that there is a significant difference between after-crisis peace status („peace 2) and pre-crisis peace status (peace 1), because “peace 1” and „peace 2” are stabilised on different power and security force-fields. The new „peace 2” circumstances constantly demanding relation and relationship system to be restored onto peace status level. In this spirit constant efforts have to be made to normalize and square the relations. This process relatively takes more time which duration regarding the experiences is as follows: To get to armed encounter from „peace 1” – in case of a long lasting crisis – takes approximately 2-6 months, to get to „peace 2” from armed conflict approximately takes 3 or 4 times more. The time needed for restoration depends on the intensity of the crisis, number of casualties, the type of applied weapons and the approach of the crisis-managing strategy. Weapons applied during the armed conflict conclude the efficiency of actions in three main ways: the scale of destruction, environmental effects and the elimination of

²² Például 1700-1870 között 117 jelentősebb konfliktust jegyeztek föl, de csak 10 esetben történt fegyveres összetűzés. L. Berek, L. Hegedűs, I. Kónya, *A honvédelmi hadászati művelet*, 36

²³ See, H. Kahn, „On Escalation“ In: L. Hajma, *Nyugati szakírók a háborúról*, 135-150.

²⁴ N. Machiavelli, *A fejedelem*, 116.

installed, hoarded and illegal weaponry. The scale of destruction depends on the quality, quantity and the inflicted damage of applied weaponry. If sides use highly destructive instruments their strategy was ruled victory at all cost, which disregarded the results, then the ran away population resettling and restoring the damages could take a wast amount of time.

Environmental effects are closely related to the scale of destruction. Environmental damages caused by chemical, biological or nuclear attacks affecting large areas are also making the restoration difficult..

The elimination of installed, illegal and hoarded weapons (minesweeping, finding undetonated weapons, destroying the collected weaponry) is a hard task for the forces taking part in peacekeeping.

The composition of applicable forces in the last phase of the conflict varies from time to time. It is practical to use light weaponry peacekeeper forces at first, later special teams (minesweeper, engineering, logistics and transportation) and police forces is at last.²⁵

Important to note that during fierce crises the use of crisis management strategy could cause fragile peace but the hazard of a renewing escalation is high.

4. A new approach to crisis management

Based upon two earlier examples I created my own charts one which classify crises according to their type an another according to the intensity of the crisis (see charts 3 and 4 describing the Resperger-style interpretation of the step by step nature of crises). While the Lund-chart focuses on peace operations, the current complex security situation clearly proves that we are facing multiple crises at the same time. Another reason for expanding the Lund-chart is that it focuses on clashes between of two state actors. However, the ever growing importance of non-state actors like Islamic State, insurgents, rebels or organised crime in contemporary armed conflicts clearly proves the proposition that in a modern crisis at least one side is a non-state actor. My chart lists various types of operations like anti-narcotics, migration control, fight against organised crime and finally every element of peace operations including preventive diplomacy, peacemaking, peace enforcement, peacekeeping and peace building. Every level of my chart, which I describe as conflict, crisis, war, stabilisation and peace, contains some relevant military, law enforcement and national security measures.

It is important to know about the chart that certain operations, for example the fight against illegal narcotics or organised crime and

²⁵ D. Last, „Organizing for Effective Peacebuilding“, *Peacekeeping and Conflict Resolution* 3/2000, 83.

operations against illegal migration, are not limited to any given stage within the crisis instead they may continue throughout the crisis. My aim was to include every possible contemporary threat on my chart because the efficient cooperation of defence, law enforcement and national security organisations is the most important requirement if we want to manage a crisis successfully.


The first stage of a conflict on my charts is peace and the aim for this period is to achieve stability by relying on peacetime training without the use of force. The second stage of a crisis is called conflict when the relevant authorities should focus on anti-narcotics operations and migration control. The third level of the chart describes which military actions are possible during a crisis, while the fourth level is mainly about setting up embargoes or blockades and fighting organised crime and this is the level where peacemaking operations happen. These actions are not the sole responsibility of the armed forces since a multifaceted crisis demands a multifaceted solution. War is the shortest but, at the same time, the most intensive period of the crisis if we take into consideration the number of deployed personnel and weapons. The most important tasks during the period of deescalation include peacekeeping, peace building, stabilising operations and setting up advisory and training missions. We have to mention that some issues may last for longer periods and some problems may have to be dealt with multiple times during a crisis. Challenges of these nature include migration control, anti-narcotics operations, the fight against organised crime and terrorism, and setting up and running blockades and embargoes.

The Hungarian legal system enumerates a number of crisis types in the Special Legal Orders section of the Fundamental Law of Hungary.²⁶ The peacetime responsibilities of the Hungarian Armed Forces are described in Article 45 of the Fundamental Law of Hungary, in Act CXIII of 2011 on National Defence and Hungarian Armed Forces and in separate legislation about the use of Hungarian Armed Forces during the period of special legal orders.²⁷ For example the participation of the Hungarian military personnel during the current migration crisis is regulated by the 25/2015 (IX.14) Joint Instruction on the Cooperation of the Hungarian Armed Forces with Law Enforcement Authorities which was issued

²⁶ Art. 48-52 Alaptörvény, http://net.jogtar.hu/jr/gen/hjegy_doc.cgi?docid=A1100425.ATV , 28.07.2016.

²⁷ 2011. évi CXIII. törvény a honvédelemről és a Magyar Honvédségről, valamint a különleges jogrendben bevezethető intézkedésekről, http://net.jogtar.hu/jr/gen/hjegy_doc.cgi?docid=A1100113.TV, 28.07.2016.

by the Interior and Defense Ministers of Hungary.²⁸ The regulations applicable during a terror emergency can be found in Article 51/A of the Fundamental Law, while the rules valid during an unexpected attack can be found in Article 52 of the Fundamental law. Moreover the ordinances valid during a State of Preventive Defence can be found in Article 51 of the Fundamental Law while the rules for a State of Emergency are described by Article 50 of the Fundamental Law. Finally Article 49 of the Fundamental Law of Hungary contains the legal framework for a State of National Crisis. The purely military responsibilities of the Hungarian Armed Forces are described in detail by the National Security Strategy of Hungary²⁹, National Military Strategy of Hungary³⁰, and in various military doctrines and regulations. (see Chart 6 for details)




4rd illustration³¹

²⁸ A belügyminiszter és a honvédelmi miniszter 25/2015. (IX. 14.) BM–HM együttes utasítása a Magyar Honvédségnek a rendőrségi feladatok ellátásában történő közreműködése rendjéről, http://frsz.hu/sites/default/files/docs/bm_ut_honved_rend.pdf, 28.07.2016.

²⁹ A Kormány 1035/2012. (II. 21.) Korm. határozata Magyarország Nemzeti Biztonsági Stratégiájáról http://2010-2014.kormany.hu/download/f/49/70000/1035_2012_korm_határozat.pdf, 28.07.2016.

³⁰ 1656/2012. (XII. 20.) Korm. határozat Magyarország Nemzeti Katonai stratégiájának elfogadásáról http://njt.hu/cgi_bin/njt_doc.cgi?docid=157721.234310, 28.07.2016.

³¹ Ed., István Resperger.

5rd illustration³²

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NOVI PRISTUP NACIONALNOM I MEĐUNARODNOM KRIZNOM MENADŽMENTU U MAĐARSKOM PRAVNOM SISTEMU

Rezime

Nacionalne i međunarodne krize utiču na osećaj sigurnosti. Imajući to u vidu, adekvatno upravljanje različitim tipovima kriza je esencijalno. Kako bi se odabrala prava metodologija, analiza sopstvenih sposobnosti (sile, moći, nacionalnog interesa) je neizbežna. Takozvani, „DIADAL (ili DDADAC – dijagnoza, pravac, alternative, odluka, primena, završetak)“ metodologija nudi moguće rešenje čitaocu. Uspešno upravljanje krizama je, kao što znamo iz obimnog iskustva, često složen i dugotrajan proces za vojni sektor, organe koji sprovode zakone, kao i za organizacije na nacionalnom nivou koje su odgovorne za upravljanje. Šanse za uspeh se mogu povećati ukoliko su učesnici svesni tih višestrukih procesa i koncepata koji utiču na ishod bilo koje krize. Cilj mog rada je bio da skrene pažnju na pristup upravljanju krizama, koji bi bio pogodan za bilo koju vrstu krize.

Ključne reči: izazov, rizik, pretnja, kriza, krizni menadžment.

³² Ed., István Resperger.

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